Cassandra Unchained @michaeljburry

New Trading Post today. Palantir, Hong Kong, SOXX, Australia, etc https://t.co/ZjU2nRBnKk

$PLTR at $137 and with that $350+ billion fully diluted market cap you can still buy Northrop Grumman $NOC, General Dynamics $GD and Lockheed Martin $LMT, and have enough left over for L3Harris $LHX. Or you could buy every single one of my 38 GameStop $GME acquisition alternatives PLUS Lockheed Martin.

It is not too late @ryancohen $GME , a list of alternatives from February 2nd: $NXST 6.3B $SAM 2.3B $SFM 6.9B $W 14B $BRKR 7B $MOH 10B $BIRK 7B $SFM 6.9B $SLM 5.5B $NAVI 1B $FMCC 4.8B $FNMA 9.7B $DOM LN 1B $FND 7.4B $POOL 9.5B $KNSL 9.2B $NEU 6.3B $FTDR 4.3B $DOM 14B $OSIS

$GME and $EBAY. Makes perfect sense.

This is an excerpt from my Asia Fund letter to investors in 2005. The emergence of Tencent, Alibaba, Meituan, and other giant companies with global ambitions was obvious back then, even if they were not yet apparent.

Hong Kong Stocks: Structure & Strategy In the last 10 years, Netflix, Broadcom, and Tencent all increased revenue between 4.5-5X. Broadcom and Netflix have been leading performers, but Tencent’s stock has almost exactly a 0% return over the last five years. This is the problem. All of Hong Kong’s massive tech stocks became massive since 2007, and the Hang Seng is today ~27,000, 15% lower than 2007... $BABA $JD $PDD $BIDU $TCOM #BABA #HangSeng #PDD #KWEB

@96Jldi Avanti. Gamestop. Samsung Electronics at book value every time. Short Amazon 2000. Buy stocks in October 2028. I literally pounded the table in front of some investors on Nvidia in 2015 Shoulda held. Feel like I'm forgetting one.

A question I have for $ORCL, $GOOG, $META, $MSFT, $AMZN, $NVDA, $CAT, and all the rest, “When does the spending for AI data center buildout actually end?” It is consuming all your cash flow, you are borrowing, you are financing in ways you never have, apparently because it is so urgent, because it scales? But if it scales, when does it end? Now you are engaging in accounting tricks to hide expense, to protect earnings, as the impact is so severe. You will be tortuously adjusting your earnings in a new and sinister ways. When does it end?

@ZaherTPI 2077: $PLTRQ $GME $1 trillion dollars Fixed that for you my friend.

Check out these two charts. This is a tomahawk dunk, a killshot. Palantir accounts receivable grew 20x while revenue growth grew 6x. DSO rose form 20 to 67 days. Q4 though is the seasonal low, and seasonal lows have been rising - 20 → 44 → 40 → 46 → 55 → 63 → 67 days. Today’s “best” quarter (67 days) is worse than the peak quarters of 2020–2021. The floor keeps rising. Government customers pay slower, but mix is far more commercial now. Larger deals are longer cycles, but Adobe does big deals and its DSO has fallen from 50 to 29. Scaling rapidly with new customers, but HubSpot is one of the fastest growing, and its DSO has been flat at 36-40 days the entire time. This also could mean increasingly aggressive revenue recognition, extended payment terms as a sales tactic/concession, contracts with back-end loaded cash - again a concession, and finally a customer just paying slower because the ROI//business use case is not strong enough to justify shorter or shortening payment terms. One would think if the customer is so enthusiastic, they would pay on time, or faster. This is not happening. Rising DSO on an absolute and comparative basis to SaaS companies suggest the company is much more consultancy that Software/SaaS. Note that Palantir's DSO is very close to Accenture on an absolute basis - 76 days at Accenture vs 72 or so this current Q at Palantir. But Palantir trends like Accenture, and unlike the SaaS/Software firms. Palantir trades at 70x sales because it has sold Wall Street that it is SaaS, not the single digit multiple of a consultant. Read more at the full post - Palantir’s New Clothes: Foundry, AIP, and the Failure of Reason

Molina Healthcare: Ghosts of GEICO Past "In 1974, however, GEICO started selling auto insurance to the public. With almost no actuarial experience, GEICO’s pricing was a guess and turned out to be too low. A frustratingly common problem in the insurance industry. This poorly informed underwriting dove-tailed with the high inflation environment and a new law forcing GEICO to take on high-risk drivers. The perfect storm sank GEICO in 1975 and into 1976, and ultimately provided the opportunity for Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway to swoop in. Buffett likes to say he bought GEICO three times – in 1951 as a student, in 1976 with Berkshire Hathaway, and 1996 when Berkshire Hathaway fully acquired GEICO. The whole saga is a testament to good analysis and patience. With that, here in 2025, I present Molina Healthcare." $MOH

$GME potential targets and plan for $100 billion, Googe's Construction in Progress is 96% of Cap Ex and is not being depreciated, likely boosting earnings, Bitcoin/Crypto and Precious Metals are linked in ways you would not think, and more. https://t.co/51VgvDZD31

Just your daily reminder that stocks are expensive. To put it in the context of my recent “Fee Fi FOUR Umm…” post, specifically the expected return discussion surrounding FISV, the difference between a 20% expected annualized long-term return on a common stock and an 10% one is logarithmic. The 20% return price can be 4x times the 10% expected return price and 8x the 8% expected return. This also explains why value investors look like idiots for extended periods. When a stock trading at the 8% expected return price ($160) falls to the 10% return price ($93), it's down 42% and everyone assumes something is broken. To get to the 15% price ($38), it needs to fall 76% from that $160 level. At that point, the business is being treated as terminal. The 20% price is just where everyone wants to give up and go home. And we only see that in any widespread fashion when everyone is indeed giving up and going home - like the 2008-2009 bottom and the second half of 2002. 2020 early in COVID got close but not like that. It’s been a long, long time since it got like that. Value investors have looked like idiots for a long, long time. Adjust the PE correctly for SBC, Depreciation, Amortization, Fixed/Capital Leases, etc, and it gets worse.

What this post says is that if you do not know your history, you cannot see that compute will ultimately accrue to the customer, not to bare metal suppliers of compute. $MSFT and $AAPL seem to know this. $META seemed to, but now commits to dominating bare metal compute. Mistake.

Fun fact, I once bought a huge block of Farmer Mac CDS from Bill for a good reason. https://t.co/p3OIz36uHn

In 2000, I was short Amazon and called the top in the market, as well as the coming rally in Old Economy stocks. I believed in that so much I left medicine July of 2020 and went long 13 Old Economy stocks such as Paccar, Ross Stores, and Clayton Homes when Scion Capital launched October 2000.

I gave an interview to Barron’s in late June, 2021 honestly trying to warn people about an imminent meme stock collapse. Barron’s published the interview July 2021, near the top for AMC. Within a month or two all were crashing and by year end 2023, they had all collapsed.

@y7_y00ts I believe I mentioned here and on Substack that I am long MOH, LULU and FOUR as positions I bought personally have been buying recently. When I had the fund, I would often trade around SEC filing dates to avoid disclosure.

I published Fannie & Freddie, Toxic Twins No More No More? It is a 30 min read, not a light lift. My Excel models for these two are downloadable at the end of the article. https://t.co/SxhG8It3nA

The first half of 2021, I made some noise and news on a number of bearish callls - TSLA, GME, Bitcoin, Robinhood, the Nasdaq 100. MANY, including journalists like Jonathan Levin and Shuli Ren @Bloomberg cite these specific examples of how wrong I have been again and again to invalidate what I am saying today, but history proves differently. This is roughly what they did from that early 2021 time to early 2023, when in the middle of the banking crisis I said I was not seeing true danger and it could resolve quickly. To look back at those calls 5, 10, years later - any short call - is ridiculous. You really think any short seller holds those positions for 5, 10 years?

Everyone that knows anything knows this. OpenAI is the next Netscape, doomed and hemorrhaging cash, Microsoft is trying to keep it afloat while keeping it off balance sheet and sucking out the IP. So why do they keep getting funded? The whole industry NEEDS a 500 billion IPO ASAP.

I never said I was short $TSLA in my SS post. @fortune @bloomberg The article also reports on an older $500 million bet. No, it was $5 million. 13Fs and journalists… The full text of what I wrote: “Outgrowing dilution, for purposes of achieving maximum present value for an enterprise, is not easy. Tesla dilutes its shareholders at about 3.6% per year, with no buybacks. The chart above shows the kind of present value destruction that this level of dilution can impart. With recent news of Elon Musk’s $1 trillion dollar pay package, dilution is certain to continue. Tesla’s market capitalization is ridiculously overvalued today and has been for a good long time. [As an aside, the Elon cult was all-in on electric cars until competition showed up, then all-in on autonomous driving until competition showed up, and now is all-in on robots – until competition shows up.] Another beauty is Palantir, which has been diluting shareholders at about a 4.6% annual rate despite buybacks. Palantir has no earnings after adjusting for stock-based compensation. Palantir has the distinction of being the first billionaire:revenue ratio greater than one that I have seen. Five billionaires due to stock ownership, and less than four billion in annual revenue.”

Remember GME? Bet you did not know this.

“But it’s Baidu” 2021:Useful life 4->5 years for servers 2024: Useful life 5->6 years for servers Took a RMB 16.2 billion impairment on RMB 30.1B net PPE. (over 50%) Had RMB 8-11 billion cap ex each of last 4 years, and Depreciation RMB 6.8 billion in 2024 In 2024, net income rose over 50% as a result of the useful life change.

Long MOH stock and Long PLTR puts, like peanut butter and bananas.